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BOOKS

IN COLD BLOOD-A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A MULTIPLE MURDER AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES. By Truman Capote. New York: Random House,

1966. Pp. 343. $5.95.
A reviewer of Truman Capote's In Cold Blood in a law review is
not expected to analyze the book's literary merits; at all events, there
can be little enough doubt on that score. No one can read the skillfully described confluence of the lives of the idealized Clutter family
and of their Caliban-like murderers, Richard Hickock and Perry
Smith, without being entrapped by Capote's economical yet strongly
emotive prose. I do, however, doubt that he has, as his publishers
claim, made a contribution towards establishing a new literary form,
the "non-fiction novel." Rebecca West, Meyer Levin, and a long company of English and American crime journalists of the late nineteeth and twentieth centuries are clearly his predecessors; but certainly Capote does contribute to this tradition with Dostoevsky-like
skill for the first two hundred pages, up to the capture of the killers.
Thereafter the cinema-like alternate vignettes become less compelling.
Literary issues apart, has In Cold Blood lessons for the lawyer or
for those interested in the prevention and treatment of crime? Not
many, and such as are to be found are trivial. The brutal crime,
which is the focal point and reason of the story, was the product of
the rambling and faulty recollection of Floyd Wells, imprisoned in
Lansing, whose garrulity operated on the determined gullibility of
Richard Hickock and the whining brutality of Perry Smith. The
safe, the object of the slaughter, never existed. Floyd Wells both
precipitated the crime and solved it. Sheriff Alvin Dewey, floundering
in uncertainty, was given the names of the killers by Wells. In that
both were convicts with long prison and criminal records, identification and, ultimately, their capture presented no challenge to scientific
or imaginative crime detection, particularly since Smith and Hickock
facilitated their own capture by returning to the state of the murder
to pursue a round of that highly detectable crime, a "paper hanging
spree"--bad checks. Their interrogation, when arrested, certainly
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did not follow patterns which would now be required by the Supreme
Court; but it is most unlikely, had more constitutionally approved
investigative procedures been followed, that they would have made
any difference whatsoever to the convictions. The evidence against
them, even without their confessions, was overwhelming; Floyd Wells'
story gave the lead which the most unskilled detective could hardly
miss.
Floyd Wells remembered his many discussions with Richard Hickock about the Clutter family. He had told Hickock of:
a sort of cabinet, or safe, or something, right behind the desk in the
room Mr. Clutter used as an office. Next thing I knew, Dick was
talking about killing Mr. Clutter. Said him and Perry was gonna go
out there and rob the place, and they was gonna kill all witnesses-the

Clutters, and anybody else who happened to be around. He described
to me a dozen times how he was gonna do it, how him and Perry
was going to tie them people up and gun them down. I told him, 'Dipk,
you'll never get by with it,' but I can't honestly say I tried to persuade
him different. Because I never for a minute believed he meant to
carry it out. I thought it was just talk. Like you hear plenty of it in
Lansing. That's about all you do hear: what a fella's gonna do when he
gets out-the hold-ups and robberies and so forth.'
And Wells was a persuasive witness since he had indeed worked
for the Clutters, knew the farm, and was manifestly speaking truth
when he related his prison conversations with Hickock.
Floyd Wells' presentation of an imagined financial opportunity to
Hickock was the criminologic catalyst to the personalities and adverse social backgrounds of the two murderers. If that satisfies you
as an aetiological statement, anything would! And Capote will give
you no more insight than that. He describes Smith and Hickock in
almost Lombrosian terms, stressing their physical stigmata, that they
were "put together unevenly," that they both suffered substantial
accidents including severe head injuries, the whole blended with most
of the pangs and sufferings of miserable and tumultuous family backgrounds. If we were searching for more precise aetiological understanding of the crime, we would want more knowledge of the early
life of Perry Smith. All that Capote tells us is of his early beating for
enuresis by the nuns at a Californian orphanage; more than this
surely was to be found in the Californian child welfare files. But
even if we had this information, I doubt that we would easily per1 Pp. 161-62.
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ceive a way in which this crime could have been prevented. For
this reason, it is a relatively uninteresting crime to the criminologist;
it bears the mark of the Beast, not the mark of Cain. The latter
we gradually better comprehend and may better prevent; the former
bewilders us by its wild irrationality.
It is conceivable, though unlikely, that different treatment of these
two criminals during the period that they were held at different times
by state authority in correctional and welfare institutions might have
prevented their killing the Clutters. It seems more likely that had
we exercised all our present correctional skills on them, these two fell
within the group which makes a certain level of murder endemic in
every society.
By this, I am not, of course, suggesting that there would not be
capacity in a better developed correctional system to minimize the
number of subsequent killings by those who have been treated by
it; I am merely affirming my belief that even applying our present
level of knowledge, which we nowhere do, it is likely that we would
have many failures, and that horrors like that described by Truman
Capote are likely in practice to remain with us for many decades.
Their avoidance at present would involve, in practice, a correctional
tyranny, a refusal to take any risk with many thousands of offenders,
which would only marginally reduce the murder rate and would create
a social and political structure that none of us would desire or tolerate.
Defense counsel was appointed suitably late in the proceedings so
that they should not in any way interfere with the prosecution's case.
The entire case for the defense, for both accused, was presented in
ninety minutes. The state had successfully opposed a defense motion
for a careful psychiatric diagnosis of the killers at the state mental
hospital in Lamed, Kansas, a hundred miles east of Garden City where
the trial was held. This was the nearest mental hospital to Garden
City. The Lamed hospital authorities had agreed to perform the
diagnoses and had advised defense counsel that they would take from
four to eight weeks. Instead, Judge Tate appointed a commission of
three Garden City doctors and directed them to pronounce a verdict
on the mental capacities of the prisoners-none was a psychiatrist.
Dr. W. Mitchell Jones did come from Topeka, Kansas, to give evidence
at the trial but he was rigidly confined by the M'Naughten Rules
'On the atypicality of the Clutter killing, see WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL
HomiCrDE (1958). Most killings involve a relationship between killer and victim that
was totally lacking in the Clutter murder.
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which, in Judge Tate's hands, became, as they so easily can become,
instruments for excluding relevant psychiatric testimony. And Dr.
Mitchell Jones had little enough evidence of Hickock's or Smith's
mental condition at the time of the killing. He had interviewed Hickock and Smith, briefly, without payment, shortly before their trial,
and had based his psychiatric judgment on these interviews, and on
autobiographical statements, which they were involved in writing,
at least in part, during the actual presentation of the prosecution's case.
Dr. Mitchell Jones was understandably cautious in his evidence.
The psychiatric condition of Hickock and Smith will never be
known; the research data is interred unstudied in Kansas. Dr. Joseph
Satten of the Meninger Clinic has suggested, from discussions with
Dr. Mitchell Jones and from a consideration of the objective facts
of his behavior, that Perry Smith had the personality structure of a
paranoid schizophrenic reaction. It may well be so; but I place no
confidence in such distant diagnoses, nor I hope does Dr. Satten.
The tale thus becomes a narrative of brutal irrationality unencumbered by any lessons for social action.
Writing in The Observer, Kenneth Tynan suggested that the coldest
cold blood in the entire narrative is that demonstrated by Truman
Capote. On the proposition that "No piece of prose, however deathless, is worth a human life" he bases a severe moral condemnation of
Capote. He argues that Capote was possessed of information which
might well have influenced the appellate courts and if not, the executive, not to execute Smith and Hickock. He notes that between the
trial and the final appeal there was ample opportunity for further
psychiatric assessment of the two killers and implies that had Truman
Capote turned his energies, influence, and literary skill to the task,
he might well have saved these two from the gallows. Had he done so,
it would have had to be a different book that Capote wrote. Had he
done so, it is unlikely indeed that it would have been a best-seller.
Kenneth Tynan draws his indictment in harsh terms. He stresses
the difference between the fifty dollars each that Truman Capote
paid Smith and Hickock for his first interview with them (and this
was the only payment he made) and the two or three million dollars
which the book is likely to make for Truman Capote. Is Tynan's
indictment just? I think not. Let it be admitted that it takes a
peculiar allegiance to literature to remain for over five years the
close and detailed observer of such a human crisis and to avoid any
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active participation in it; one may marvel at such self-control, but
one should not condemn another for it. Can there be observers-mere
observers and narrators--of such social dramas? It seems to me entirely within the writer's craft to take this role to himself and to
fulfill it as honestly as he can without meriting the type of criticism
that Kenneth Tynan has offered. Indeed, only in one way can I see
any argument that Capote's intervention in the lives of Smith and
Hickock at all related to their final demise. It might be argued that
others in Kansas, acquainted with the case, would know, as they
must have, of Capote's close interest in and knowledge of these two
killers. And knowing also of his reputation, influence and literary
capacity, they might have concluded that had there been anything
worthwhile to be said on behalf of the killers, more than had been
said, Capote would have said it. One might, in effect, set up an
argument of reliance by others on Capote in a role other than that
which he saw himself as fulfilling. From such an argument it might
be possible to develop a contention that Capote therefore had, knowing of this reliance, an obligation not to fail the two main subjects
of his narrative even if that should frustrate his entire literary purpose; that he had a duty to become a participant observer, not merely
an observer. Well, the argument can be made, but there is little to
support it. One may not empathize with Capote's passivity, but one
can hardly properly criticize it.
So, with what are we left? A literary tour de force on the subject
of a meaningless and lessonless slaughter. No character insights of
consequence. Speed and movement rather than depth and understanding; a seductive survey of the brutal and inconsequential. Capote's feat is like that of the juggler, of consummate skill; but, one
wonders, why do it?
"
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